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Abstract
Today, most middle-end mobile phones embed a Java runtime environment that can execute pro-
grams downloaded on the network by the user. This new functionality creates great opportunities
for new services but also brings the full range of risks that existed on the personal computer to the
phone.
Telecommunication operators are the last warrant of the quality of the software downloaded by
their customers and might sign the applications they trust. Unfortunately they have little evidence
to check the quality of the contents of the jammed bytecode they receive from developers. The tra-
ditional evaluation process relies mostly on the manual testing of the software on actual terminals.
But this is not adapted for security properties.
MATOS (Midlet Analysis TOol Suite) is a static analysis tool that checks the possible values passed
to some identiﬁed methods directly on the compiled application. It is used by the test teams of
the mobile operator Orange to check what kind of connections are opened by MIDP applications.
We will present the security requirements we want to check, how MATOS helps to ensure them
and how the necessary analysis are performed using a combination of (rather) well-known analysis
techniques.
Keywords: Static analysis, bytecode, mobiles.
1 Java downloadable applications
1.1 Execution environments for downloadable applications
Most modern mobile phones oﬀer a mechanism to download applications from
the network. The ability to download applications and the capacity of the
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handsets to exchange data with various protocols such as SMS, GPRS or Blue-
tooth extend the possible usages of the mobile phone (e-commerce, database
front-ends, games, etc.) but they also create new security risks that are similar
to the ones already present on personal computers.
During summer 2004, the ﬁrst proof-of-concept worm on mobile phone
named cabir was revealed. It targeted the Symbian operating system and it
was later followed by similar viruses, developed for Windows Mobile operating
system from Microsoft.
Java oﬀers an interesting alternative to open operating systems because it
provides a software “sandbox” that prevents the anarchic use of system re-
sources: the information ﬂow and the control ﬂow are bounded by the Java
type system and when an application tries to access a resource in a way forbid-
den by the security policy, a runtime security check will abort the execution
of the program. Medium and high-end mobile handsets embed a Java runtime
environment with a set of specialized libraries for small mobile devices (called
a proﬁle). MIDP, the proﬁle deﬁned within JCP process 2 , and DoJa, the
proprietary proﬁle from NTT DoCoMo, are the most common environments.
A Java conﬁguration deﬁnes the expressive power of the language. CLDC
[8,7] is one of the lightest version: CLDC programs are real applications using
dynamic allocation of objects or threads but they cannot use programmatic
reﬂection 3 or interfaces to native libraries or the dynamic downloading of
Java code.
A proﬁle is a standardized set of libraries targeted to an application area.
The MIDP [9,6] proﬁle is used on top of the CLDC conﬁguration and deﬁnes a
small graphical user interface suitable for phone handsets, a generic framework
to establish connections and a small database to manage persistent data. Some
standardized extensions (eg. MMAPI or WMA) provide support for more
complex multimedia data and network protocols.
MIDP also deﬁnes the life cycle of an application. An application (also
called a MIDlet suite) is made of a descriptor ﬁle (also called the JAD ﬁle)
and a standard Java archive ﬁle (called the JAR ﬁle) that contains the whole
code of the application. The descriptor ﬁle contains one or possibly sev-
eral entry points for the applications (the MIDlets). Each MIDlet is imple-
mented by a class that inherits from an abstract class used as a template:
javax.microedition.midlet.MIDlet and it must deﬁne some special call-
backs for creating, launching and stopping the application.
2 The standardization of Java led by SUN.
3 except Class.forname that will require a special treatment but it can only refer to a
class already on the phone.
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1.2 Java MIDP security mechanisms and their limits
The underlying principle of MIDP security is that an application can perform
any action a user could do, but if an action may hit the security of the user
(examples of such functionalities are sending SMS, registering an application
to react later on a given event, taking a picture, geo-localizing the handset),
then the user should explicitly give his permission prior to the action. De-
pending on the level of control, this acknowledgement may be given once for
all, once per session or each time the functionality is used.
Furthermore, MIDP2.0 provides a second level of protection: digital sig-
natures. The operator or the handset manufacturer can sign an application to
express they trust it. The application will then belong to a given “protection
domain”. Priviledges of a MIDlet suite are raised up to the level attached
to a protection domain (Operator, Manufacturer or Trusted 3rd Party) by
checking the signature of the MIDlet suite with the digital certiﬁcates stored
in the mobile equipment (system formed of the mobile handset and a SIM
card). This will enable the access to more functionalities on the handset or
reduce the number of security queries asked to the user.
Even if the sandbox mechanism provides a reasonable level of security,
there are good reasons to evaluate applications before their deployment:
• The security policies embedded on the terminal are too coarse-grained. In
litigious cases, the system relies on the user but the user may not have all
the necessary information (for example, in some countries, it is diﬃcult to
know the cost of an overcharged SMS message from its number);
• security checks are done at runtime when the action is going to be per-
formed. Some psychological eﬀects may impair the judgement of the user:
· too many warning screens may drive the user to acknowledge an action
without reading the screen;
· if the user has performed many complex actions to reach that point, he
may answer positively to an action he would have not performed otherwise.
· furthermore the user doesn’t know how many charged actions are still
necessary to complete the process.
• some operations could aﬀect the network (denial of service attacks: send-
ing a message from hundreds of phones at a given date, for example), the
operator should have a way to check and prevent those attacks.
• when a midlet is signed, the signature issuer is de facto responsible of the be-
havior of applications carrying it’s signature. Owners of digital certiﬁcates
enabling priviledge elevation in MIDP 2.0 are responsible of the means they
use to avoid signing malicious MIDlets. On a signed MIDlet, some security
warnings for the user are suppressed. To safely sign the MIDlet, the operator
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should know beforehand the contents and the number of the conﬁrmation
screens that will disappear after he will have signed the application.
The operator could develop his applications or commission a trusted entity
to develop them. But most applications are provided by independent contents
providers and they only supply the compiled application to the operator. So
the validation must be performed directly on the bytecode without even the
help of a speciﬁcation. The current practice is the following:
• the operator uses contracts as a deterrent with the developers to ensure that
security rules are enforced;
• the operator tests the application (or rather has it tested). Sun with a
group of handset manufacturers and operators has created a consortium
to deﬁne a common grid for evaluating applications: the “Uniﬁed Testing
Criteria”. The current version of the criteria targets the ergonomics and
the functionality of the application rather than the security which is more
diﬃcult to evaluate through testing. The amount of time devoted to testing
an application is necessarily very limited because of budget constraints.
Moreover testers have only access to the object code (black-box testing)
and not the source code or at least the speciﬁcations.
• the operator uses automatic tools to control the contents of the bytecode.
This is the path that will be explored in the remainder of this paper.
1.3 A minimal security proﬁle for MIDP applications
Usually, security evaluation means checking the application against its spec-
iﬁcation and checking the consistency of this speciﬁcation. Unfortunately
applications are closed binaries for the operator and in any case, it is im-
possible to check completely an application with the economic constraints
put on the evaluation process (a cost per application well below 1000 euros).
The goal of the evaluation process will rather be to extract an approximate
sub-speciﬁcation of the application behaviour from its code and check that it
implies the harmlessness of the application for its user, which means:
• that the use of charged resources is controlled,
• that it does not destroy or steal user assets,
• that it does not block the terminal.
A last important issue for the operator is the compatibility of the MIDlet
with a given handset (most MIDlets are charged and it is not acceptable
to propose a MIDlet not compatible with the customer handset). Although
MIDP is standardized, there are proprietary extensions either because there
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is a speciﬁc capability that may be not available on the handset (Bluetooth
connectivity, video capture) or for which no standard API has been deﬁned
(SMS in MIDP1.0, geo-localization until recently), because the amount of a
given resource cannot be ﬁxed (size of the screen) or because there are too
many possible values (various video or audio formats, network settings).
A classiﬁcation of the properties to check exhibit the following ﬁve cate-
gories ordered by increasing complexity:
• controlling the use of a given class or method,
• controlling the possible values of the arguments of a given method,
• counting the number (or at least a bound) of calls of a given method,
• controlling the use of data inside a MIDlet (transfer of information between
the user interface, the store and the network (eventually also with other
devices like the SIM),
• controlling more accurately the temporal behaviour of the MIDlet.
The ﬁrst generation of automatic tools answered the ﬁrst issue. We will
concentrate on the second category as it corresponds to the most urgent needs
(knowing the kind of connections established by a MIDlet). The third is the
necessary complement to the second to get an exact picture of the warnings
suppressed by signing a MIDlet. The fourth category of properties should be
used for semi-critical MIDlets handling data such as credit card number or
personal information. The last category is useful to check that the application
works 4 and that it does not try to exploit a handset bug 5
2 Automatic veriﬁcations performed by MATOS
MATOS (Midlet Analysis TOol Suite) is the tool developed by France Telecom
to automatically validate MIDlets. MATOS is built as a framework that takes
a MIDlet suite and a policy ﬁle as arguments and performs a set of independent
veriﬁcation phases depending on the contents of the policy ﬁle. Phases can be
either global for a given MIDlet suite or launched on each MIDlet:
A JAD conformity analysis it is a textual analysis that checks that the
descriptions of the MIDlet, in the descriptor ﬁle and in the manifest ﬁle of
the java archive, are consistent.
4 There are strict rules to follow to design a GUI, display or sound, that works properly on
several phones.
5 As an example, on some phones, a developer can hide the conﬁrmation screens presented
to the user when an SMS is sent if he calls the sending of the SMS and the displaying of
the screens in an unexpected sequence.
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A class and method control that checks that the MIDlet only uses regular
MIDP APIs and registered proprietary extensions.
An argument analysis that checks whether the arguments used in the calls
of critical methods fulﬁl the requirements expressed in the development
charter.
The core of MATOS is the argument analysis but the results are valid only if
the set of APIs used by the MIDlet suite are restricted to the subset for which
security rules have been designed. Checking that this hypothesis is valid is
the main goal of the class and method control.
3 Static analysis of method arguments
The main achievement of MATOS is to identify the calls to MIDP methods
considered as dangerous, to provide an approximation of the set of the possible
values of their arguments and to check that they are acceptable according to
a given security policy.
3.1 Rationale for the choice of the analysis
The arguments we want to control are mainly the ones that should be pre-
sented to the user when he accepts a security sensitive operation according
to MIDP 2.0 security policy 6 . Most of them are of type String: URLs
of opened connections, names of MIDlets delayed or names of the record
databases opened by the MIDlet. Names are usually constant strings de-
ﬁned in the program. URLs may have a computed component but there is
usually a ﬁxed preﬁx containing the connection scheme and the destination
address 7 .
Consequently we have decided to concentrate on the analysis of object
references and strings in particular. In Java, objects of type String are not
mutable. Complex strings can be built with the help of a StringBuffer object
that accumulates elementary components and transforms the whole in a result
string.
We will use the following assumption on the way critical strings are built:
concatenation operations are done with local StringBuffer objects (objects
only assigned to a local variable). This assumption has been validated by
experience on a collection of free MIDlets (see section 4).
6 In fact a lot of implementations do not bother to explicitly show the URL of the connection
to the user.
7 URLs follow the general framework deﬁned by IETF standards [2]:
scheme://[user[:password]@]host[:port]/localpath?arguments.
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3.2 Principle of the analysis
The analysis must be performed on the bytecode because it is the only form
of the application available to the test teams. Designing and implementing
a new static analysis for a complete language like the Java bytecode is time
consuming and error-prone. Classpath resolution, native methods handling,
basic handling of Class.forName are some examples of the technical points
that must be handled to level a theoretically sound analysis to a practical tool.
Therefore we have chosen to rely on existing libraries and to combine them
to build a solution. MATOS uses components from SOOT, a complete frame-
work [16] for the optimisation of bytecode developed at Mc Gill University in
Montreal. Like most optimising compilers, it provides :
• basic local dataﬂow analysis (forward or backward) [12],
• advanced devirtualisation analysis: we will rely on its points-to analysis,
• a simpler intermediate language called Jimple which is a stack-less version
of the Java bytecode.
3.2.1 Syntax for the results
We will present the analysis for strings. Results are coded as regular expres-
sions (or automata) that model an upper approximation of all the possible
values of the strings. A result is a couple (v, R) where v is an abstract vari-
able in a set V and R is a set of simple deﬁnitions where the syntax of a
deﬁnition is deﬁned by the following grammar:
<definition> ::= <var> = <expr>
<expr> ::= <expr> + <expr> // String concatenation
| <expr> | <expr> // Alternatives
| * // bottom value (anything)
| "<string constant>" // A string constant
| <var> // a variable
3.2.2 Points-to analysis
The goal of a points-to analysis is to provide an approximation of the points
of deﬁnition (points of allocation for an object) of the possible contents of a
storage cell (in Java, a local variable, a static or an instance ﬁeld).
It is a very classical analysis ﬁrst designed for the C language [1,14] and
then adapted to Java [17,11,13,10]. Points-to analysis can be used for precise
class-analysis (also known as devirtualization) [10] as the exact class of an
object is known at its allocation point. It is also used in escape analysis [17],
and synchronization removal [4].
A points-to analysis can usually be modelled as two related phases:
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• ﬁrst, a model of the program is built where allocation nodes and variables
are abstracted and linked together to form a ﬂow graph. Building this graph
usually requires that an approximation of class analysis has already been
done. How this support analysis and the points-to analysis cooperate is a
place for variations between diﬀerent methods (see [10] for various options),
• Then the information carried on the allocation nodes is propagated through
the graph. The information can be annotated with contextual information
like the contents of the call-stack when the allocation was performed.
We will write P(v) for the result of the points-to analysis of v.
3.2.3 Def/Use analysis
The def/use analysis is a simple forward dataﬂow analysis that links the state-
ments that deﬁne the contents of a (local) variable with the statements that
use it. The analysis is local to a given method.
Def/use analysis can be used to build the set of possible deﬁnitions of a
value at any point in the program. We represent each set of values by an
abstract variable and a set of simple equations where an elementary equation
has the following syntax:
<definition> ::= <var> = <expr>
<expr> ::= <expr> | <expr> // Alternatives
| "<string constant>" // A string constant
| <var> // a variable
| %i // i-eth parameter
| o.m(<expr>,...<expr>) // method invocation
| o.f // field reference
Each variable in an equation represents an occurrence of a variable at a point
of use. An elementary expression on the right hand side represents the in-
struction at the possible point of deﬁnition. This syntax is very close to the
syntax of results.
3.2.4 Combining analysis
The main problem of points-to analysis is that it is a control-ﬂow insensitive
analysis. Therefore it is not possible to follow operations with side eﬀects like
concatenation with StringBuffer. So we combine it with a def/use analysis
to handle concatenations when they are limited to a method. This is the most
common case in Java as the classical idiom s1 + s2 is translated into the
allocation of a hidden buﬀer to which the two strings are appended and its
transformation back to a non-mutable string.
The algorithm proceeds as follow. A goal to solve can be either:
• < C,m, i > - evaluate the possible values of the i-eth argument of a call to
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a method m of class C,
• < C, f > - evaluate the possible values of a ﬁeld f of class C,
• < C,m > - evaluate the possible values returned by a method m of class C.
The algorithm uses the following sets of values:
• a working set W of pairs (v, g) ∈ V ×G,
• a result set R that contains equations,
• a ﬁnite map S : G → V from solved goals to the variables used as entry
points in R for their solution.
Initially, S = R = ∅ and W contains the initial goals deﬁned by the security
policy with identiﬁed variables to use to label the result.
The main argument for the termination of the procedure is that terms
describing goals are built on a ﬁnite alphabet and each goal is solved in a
bounded time. The algorithm iterates the process presented below on the
goal set W until it is empty.
(i) A goal (v, g) of W is selected and g → v is added to S. There is a support
variable vg in the program whose set of possible values correspond to a
solution of g:
• if g =< C,m, i > then vg is the i-eth parameter,
• if g =< C, f > then vg is the ﬁeld,
• if g =< C,m > then vg is the pseudo-variable introduced for the return
statement.
(ii) We look at the contents of P(vg) :
• either all the values that may be stored in the variable are string con-
stants and the goal is solved. If P(vg) = s1 . . . sn are , then we add
v = x1‖...‖xn to R and launch a new iteration on the next goal (back
to step 1),
• or there are computed values and we proceed to the next step.
(iii) For each goal there is a set of instructions and corresponding variables
that deﬁne the possible values for the goal:
• if g =< C,m, i, v > the instructions are the invocation of the method m
(ﬁnding them requires a class analysis, we use the result of the points-to
analysis) and the variable the i-th argument of each invocation,
• if g =< C, f, v >, the instructions are the ones that store a new value
in the ﬁeld f (here again a class analysis is required) and the variable
is the contents,
• if g =< C,m, v >, the instructions are the return instructions in the
code of the method m and the variable is the pseudo return variable.
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(iv) We use the def/use analysis to get the local expression that deﬁnes each
value. The result of the analysis is a pair (v0, D) where v0 is a variable
and D is a set of equations that represents the possible deﬁnitions that
we must translate into a set of equations describing possible string values.
We add v = v0 to R and we iterate through each equation vd = ed of
D. The interesting cases of the translation are the following:
• the value to follow is the result of a special String or StringBuﬀer oper-
ation (string concatenation, transformation of a string buﬀer in a string
or vice versa): the equation is translated in the corresponding operation
on strings (conversion operations are silently ignored) and added to R;
• the value to follow is a string result of a regular method invocation o.m
where o can be of classes {Ci}i∈I after class analysis. We add the goal
{< Ci, m > /i ∈ I},
• the value to follow is the i-eth parameter of the current method C.m:
we add the goal < C,m, i >,
• the value to follow is a ﬁeld o.f . If o.f is of type String and the possible
classes of o are {Ci}i∈I then we add the goals {< Ci, f > /i ∈ I}
• otherwise the equation cannot be interpreted and the result v = ∗ is
added to R.
To add a goal g means that if g is not in the domain of S then (vd, g) is
added to W otherwise vd = S(g) is added to R.
The program variables that are the focus of the analysis may be of type
StringBuffer. We must be careful that those variables are local and we
prohibit the analysis of ﬁelds of type StringBuffer because the points-to
analysis and the iteration process ignore the control-ﬂow of the program.
3.3 Validation of the arguments
The properties to check contain the following information:
• what arguments should be checked,
• what are the acceptable values,
• how the result of the analysis should be presented to the tester.
Each property is deﬁned by a rule that identiﬁes the data to analyse (using
the method presented in 3.2.4) and a ﬁlter that describes what is expected
and how to present the results. Most ﬁlters are built from two components:
• the ﬁrst one checks that there is enough information to give back a mean-
ingful verdict (for example every value returned for a given argument must
contain a ﬁxed preﬁx with enough letters)
• the second checks the actual conformity of the diﬀerent values found with
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TextField phoneField;
...
sendOne("sms://" + phoneField.getString());
...
private void sendOne(String phone) {
MessageConnection co=(MessageConnection) Connector.open(phone);
TextMessage msg = ...
co.send(msg); ... }
Fig. 1. Relevant fragments of the test program.
<rule name="connector-1">
<args class="javax.microedition.io.Connector"
signature=
"javax.microedition.io.Connection open(java.lang.String)"
report="connector-report">
<argument position="1"/> </args>
<description> This rule checks ... </description>
</rule>
<report name="connector-report">
<description> This report ... </description>
<pseudoString>
<filter pattern="\x22([^:]*):([^\x22]*)\x22">
<b> An identified network connection with the following
parameters: </b>
<ul> <li> Method called: %C.%M </li>
<li> Method hosting the call: %c.%m </li>
<li> URL used: %r </li>
<li> Computable prefix: %1:%2 </li>
<li> Scheme used: <font color="green"> %1 </font>
</li></ul></filter>
...
<filter pattern=".*"> ... </filter>
</pseudoString>
</report>
Fig. 2. Relevant fragments of the rule proﬁle used
the security policy.
Each elementary ﬁlter is made of a sequence of pairs made of a regular
expression and a text to print. For each argument the possible values are
enumerated, loops are eliminated by considering that the looping part is an
unsolved string. The tool selects the ﬁrst ﬁlter that matches the value analysed
and prints the corresponding text. The text may refer to parts of the matche
d expression.
The proﬁle is written with an XML syntax and contains its own documen-
tation. Modifying the rules and ﬁlters can be performed by an engineer with
a good understanding of security policies and of Java but it is not necessary
that he has an in-depth understanding of how the tool works.
3.4 Example
As an illustration, ﬁgure 1 presents some fragments of a archetypal program
to analyze with a proﬁle that contains the rules given in ﬁgure 2. The result
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An identiﬁed network connection with the following parameters:
- Method called: javax.microedition.io.Connector.open
- Method hosting the call: Test1.sendOne
- URL used: ”sms://” + javax.microedition.lcdui.TextField.getString(*)
- Computable preﬁx: sms://
- Scheme used: sms
Fig. 3. Result of the analysis
of the analysis is given in ﬁgure 3. The evaluator can see that the application
may send an SMS to a phonenumber obtained from a dialog with the user.
4 Results and limitations
4.1 Benchmarks
MATOS has been tested on a collection of 415 free MIDlets from the site
www.midlet.org. We have analysed the opening of a connection (functions in
the class javax.microedition.io.Connector). The MIDlets retrieved have
the following characteristics:
• they were MIDP 1.0 MIDlets (MIDP 2.0 was just appearing),
• some of them use proprietary extensions: for example Siemens r Nokia
packages to send SMS messages,
• a quarter (127) of them create connections of any kind and require a real
analysis (156 connection openings). Most of them are HTTP connections.
The results are the following:
• a simple points-to analysis for constants can guess the target of 33 invocation
of the openings of a connection (26%)
• the complete analysis can solve 80 % (126) of the questions.
• time for the analysis is less than 5s per MIDlet 8 and is almost constant.
Because connections are HTTP connections, most of the URL contain a vari-
able part corresponding to the arguments of the query, so a pure points-to
analysis is not suﬃcient.
Because the MIDP library is huge compared to the code of the MIDlet, the
time required for the analysis is almost constant (in fact, we use a stripped
down version of MIDP whose semantics only respect the possible control paths
and data paths between elements). The cost of the analysis is still too high
to be performed on the handset.
The main reasons for the last 20% of unresolved URLs are the following:
• too much computation of the URL (substrings)
8 Times taken on a 1.6 Ghz centrino laptop with 512 Mb memory.
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• use of non local StringBuﬀer objects (rare)
• use of heap structures shared with other portion of the code (Hashtables,
vectors). A more precise contextual analysis could solve these cases.
• URL coming from external resources (record databases, value fetched from
the network, etc).
The main limitation of the tool is that it can only control object references
and not values of a primitive type because the points-to analysis only consider
objects. In fact MATOS can follow constant integers when they are used
locally because of the local def/use analysis. This is enough to check integers
used as pseudo enumerated constants because developers refer to the symbolic
value which is inlined by the compiler (because it is a ﬁnal static ﬁeld).
4.2 A development charter
As shown above, as any static analysis tool, MATOS only builds an approxi-
mation of the actual values of the arguments and may not be able to decide
whether a security property is respected or not. To be able to guarantee to
the developer that MATOS will have enough information to successfully check
a security property when it is respected, we ask the developers to follow a
“development charter” that requires explicitly that the URL arguments are
built following the deﬁnition of a “pseudo-constants”. Those rules express the
fact that strings are almost constants and that concatenation is used wisely
and are in fact more strict than necessary but they are easier to understand
than a precise characterisation of the capacity of analysis of the tool.
4.3 Comparison with other works
The ﬁrst generation of automatic tools, directly integrated on commercial
provisioning platforms [5], checked the use of a given class in a MIDlet and
compared it with the contents of a database to check the availability of the
API on a given handset.
The closest tool is Trusted Logic MIDP Validation Tool, an extension of
a tool originally designed for Java Card applets validation. The tool has
similar objectives (verifying arguments) but is based on a probably cleaner
abstract interpretation model. There is no result available on its performances
especially on its handling of computed values.
The Java String Analyzer (JSA) developed at BRICS [3] computes a ﬁnite
state automaton that provides an upper approximation of the values of string
expressions. It is used to control strings appearing in web services, XML
transformation or SQL queries.
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4.4 Towards a standardization of security requirements for MIDP
Recently, Sun and a group of device manufacturers launched a program called
”Java Veriﬁed”; all the devices from these manufacturers will embed the Java
Veriﬁed certiﬁcate. Applications signed by ”Java Veriﬁed” will be granted
the privileges of ”Trusted 3rd Party” applications. Java Veriﬁed relies on
a set of MIDlet test criteria called ”Uniﬁed Test Criteria” (UTC) [15]. We
claim that automatic argument approximation oﬀers a viable technological
option in order to check new UTC requirements such as: “the MIDlet does
not make network connections out of ones described by the developer” and
such a security assurance requirement would increase the conﬁdence level of
UTC compliant MIDlet suites.
5 Conclusion and further works
5.1 Achievements
We have shown why operators have to analyse the bytecode of downloadable
applications to ensure a correct level of security for their customers and that
it was possible to develop a useful and robust automatic tool for validating
MIDlets by assembling existing analysis bricks developed for other purposes.
The tool is used by the test teams of the mobile operator Orange to check the
applications it proposes. A web version of the tool may be made available to
developers on the Orange developer portal.
We think that the results obtained are accurate in the most useful cases.
Advocating the need for clean programming in the developer community and
the usefulness of automatic security evaluation for maintaining the conﬁdence
of the customers should help to make the last issues disappear. Providing a
way to control the connections opened by a MIDlet is now a requirement of
the Uniﬁed Testing Criteria [15].
5.2 Assumptions on the virtual machine
All those analyses rely on the assumption that the terminal is safe: well-
typed applications should have a completely bounded control-ﬂow. Bugs in
implementations of the MIDP library or in the core of the virtual machine,
attacks on the hardware at low level can ruin the eﬀort put on application
validation. More eﬀort should be devoted to the isolation and prooﬁng of a
real trusted computing base on the handset.
Another assumption made by the analysis on the virtual machine is that all
the code of the application is known (no dynamic loading), no reﬂective prop-
erty of the language was used (there is none in J2ME except Class.forName)
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and that there is no native code extensions to application (no JNI support).
All those assumptions are veriﬁed by the J2ME CLDC conﬁguration but not
by J2ME CDC or J2SE. It is not clear whether it would be possible to extend
the analysis to those environments.
5.3 Further works and open issue
We are planning to add new phases to MATOS that would give the test team
a better understanding of how MIDlets are built before they run it on a real
handset: what are the diﬀerent screens and how does the information ﬂow
through the MIDlet. Those additions would solve most of the remaining se-
curity validation requirements.
On the other hand, checking the compatibility and dependability of a MI-
Dlet for a given handset is a completely open issue: ﬁrst there are a lot of
informal ergonomic requirements (use of the full screen, choice of the buttons,
choice of colours), second there are various compatibility issues speciﬁc to
each terminal that are diﬃcult to model (behaviour of audio players, issues in
memory layout, control on the lifecycle of the MIDlet when an external event
occurs, etc.).
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